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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 The Board of Trustees of the District No. 15  
Machinists' Pension Fund (Fund or Pension Fund) appeals the 
dismissal of their action to collect an assessment of withdrawal 
liability filed against Kahle Engineering Corp. under the 
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), Pub. 
L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001a, 1381-1453 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), which amended   
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. 
L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
  
1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).  The district court entered 
summary judgment against the Fund on the basis of the statute of 
limitations. 
 This appeal requires us to determine whether the 
district court correctly held that the six-year statute of 
limitations in the MPPAA began to run for the entire liability 
when the employer first missed an installment payment, even 
though the payout period was more than nine years.  Apparently, 
no federal appellate court has addressed this precise issue of 
statutory interpretation under the MPPAA although two other 
courts of appeals have decided cases which suggest possible, and 
conflicting, interpretations.   
 I. 
  
  The Statutory Scheme 
 The MPPAA was enacted by Congress in 1980 as an 
amendment to ERISA to insure the financial stability of 
multiemployer pension plans by imposing mandatory liability on 
employers withdrawing from a pension plan.  See Laborers Health 
and Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 
U.S. 539, 545 (1987).  In IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & 
Williamson, 788 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1986), we identified two goals 
for the MPPAA: "'to protect the interests of participants and 
beneficiaries in financially distressed multiemployer plans, and 
. . . to ensure benefit security to plan participants.'"  Id. at 
127 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 71, 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918, 2939).  The principal manner 
in which these goals are effectuated by the act is by the 
imposition of withdrawal liability on an employer who withdraws 
from a multiemployer pension plan in the proportionate share of 
the plan's unfunded vested benefits.  Crown Cork & Seal v. 
Central States Pension Fund, 982 F.2d 857, 861 (3d Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2961 (1993); see also Concrete Pipe and 
Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 113 S. 
Ct. 2264, 2272 (1993).  
 The statute sets forth an intricate scheme for the 
calculation and collection of the withdrawal liability and 
resolution of disputes with respect thereto.1  When an employer 
                     
1
.  The statutory scheme is supplemented by regulations 
promulgated by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).  
As enacted in 1974, ERISA created the PBGC within the Department 
of Labor "to administer and enforce a pension plan termination 
  
withdraws from a multiemployer plan, the plan sponsor must 
determine the amount of withdrawal liability, and "as soon as 
practicable" notify the employer of the amount of liability and 
the schedule for repayments and demand payment in accordance with 
that schedule.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1382, 1399(b)(1).  The plan 
sponsor must set up a schedule for withdrawal payments which may 
impose liability to a maximum of twenty years.  Id. §§ 
1399(b)(1)(A)(ii), 1399(c)(1).  The first installment payment on 
the schedule is due within sixty days of the plan sponsor's 
demand.  Id. § 1399(c)(2).  Under an exception for labor-
disputes, the employer shall not be considered to have withdrawn 
from a plan solely because an employer suspends contributions 
during a labor dispute involving its employees.  Id. § 1398.  
 No later than ninety days after the employer receives 
notice from the plan sponsor of the determination of withdrawal 
liability, the employer may ask the plan sponsor to review any 
specific matter and to reassess the schedule of payments; "may 
identify any inaccuracy in the determination of the amount of the 
unfunded vested benefits allocable to the employer;" and may 
furnish any additional relevant information to the plan sponsor.  
Id. § 1399(b)(2)(A).  The plan sponsor must conduct a reasonable 
review of any matter raised by the employer, and notify the 
(..continued) 
insurance program" and granted it the statutory authority to 
promulgate regulations in carrying out the purposes of ERISA.  
See Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2271 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 
1302(a)-(b)). 
  
employer of its decision, the basis for its decision, and any 
changes made as a result of the review.   Id. § 1399(b)(2)(B).   
 An employer who wishes to contest the fact of its 
liability or the amount must initiate arbitration.  If it does 
not, it waives the right to contest the assessment and the 
amounts demanded by the plan sponsor become "due and owing" as 
set forth on the payment schedule, and the employer may be sued 
for collection in state or federal court.  Id. § 1401(b)(1). 
   Under the acceleration provision of the statute 
available in the event of a default, the "plan sponsor may 
require immediate payment of the outstanding amount of the 
employer's withdrawal liability, plus accrued interest on the 
total outstanding liability from the due date of the first 
payment which was not timely made."  Id. § 1399(c)(5); see also 
29 C.F.R. § 2644.2(b)(2).  For purposes of this section, default 
is defined as "the failure of an employer to make, when due, any 
payment if not cured within sixty days after the employer 
receives written notification from the plan sponsor of such 
failure."  29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5)(A).  A default can also be "any 
other event defined by the plan rules which indicates a 
substantial likelihood that an employer will be unable to pay its 
withdrawal liability."  Id. § 1399(c)(5)(B).   
 A PBGC regulation prohibits a declaration of default 
for failure to make timely payments during the period, and for 
sixty days thereafter, that an arbitration is pending or that the 
plan sponsor is conducting the employer's requested review.  See 
29 C.F.R. § 2644.2(c)(1).  However, the statute provides that 
  
payments in accordance with the schedule set forth by the plan 
sponsor must be made "notwithstanding any request for review or 
appeal of determinations of the amount of such liability or of 
the schedule."  29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(2).  If an employer misses a 
scheduled payment, the fund may seek to collect by filing a 
collection action but it may not accelerate the balance during 
that protected arbitration period.  See United Retail and 
Wholesale Employees Pension Plan v. Yahn & McDonald, 787 F.2d 
128, 131 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided 
court sub nom., PBGC v. Yahn & McDonald, 481 U.S. 735 (1987) 
(hereinafter Yahn).  
 An action for liability under the MPPAA may be brought 
by a plan fiduciary, employer, plan participant, beneficiary or 
an employee organization which represents such a plan participant 
or beneficiary "adversely affected by the act or omission of any 
party" under the statute or by an employee organization.  29 
U.S.C. § 1451(a)(1).  That action must be filed within six years 
after the date on which "the cause of action" arose.  Id. § 
1451(f)(1).2 
                     
2
.  Under another prong of the statute of limitations provision, 
not at issue here, the action may also be brought within three 
years after the plaintiff knew or should have known of the 
existence of such a cause of action except that in the case of 
fraud or concealment, this "discovery prong" is extended to six 
years.  The full text of the provision is: 
 
 An action under this section may not be brought after 
the later of - 
 
  (1) 6 years after the date on which the cause of 
action arose, or 
 
  
 With the statutory scheme in mind, we turn to the facts 
of this case.  Our task is to determine when the Pension Fund's 
"cause of action" that is the subject of this suit arose.  
 
 II. 
 Facts and Procedural History 
 Kahle was a contributing employer to the Pension Fund 
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreements it entered into 
with its union.  Following a labor dispute in 1981, Kahle 
suspended contributions to the Pension Fund.  On April 23, 1984, 
in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §§ 1382, 1399(b)(1), the Fund 
notified Kahle in writing that it had determined that Kahle had 
withdrawn from the Fund and requested payment of withdrawal 
liability in the amount of $271,746, payable in thirty-eight 
quarterly installment payments of $9,467 each, beginning on July 
1, 1984, with a final thirty-ninth payment of $6,459, payable in 
January, 1994.3  The April 23 letter also notified Kahle of its 
(..continued) 
  (2) 3 years after the earliest date on which the 
plaintiff acquired or should have acquired actual knowledge of 
the existence of such cause of action; except that in the case of 
fraud or concealment, such action may be brought not later than 6 
years after the date of discovery of the existence of such cause 
of action. 
 
See 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f). 
3
.   We note that the payment figures total $366,205, which the 
Pension Fund explained in the district court was attributable to 
interest on the principal amount of $271,746.  Kahle objected to 
the interest, but it is unclear whether it objected to the fact 
of interest or its computation.  We will leave that issue to the 
district court on remand. 
  
statutory right to request review from the Fund, to identify any 
inaccuracies, and to furnish any additional relevant information.  
 In response, on July 2, l984 Kahle wrote that it "has 
not withdrawn from the Fund," that the cessation of contributions 
was caused solely by a strike which commenced on June 22, 1981 
and continued in 1982, and that the company remains ready and 
willing to negotiate with the Union.  The letter stated it 
constituted an official request under section 4219(b)(2) of ERISA 
[29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2)] for review of the Fund's determination 
that the company had withdrawn, that withdrawal occurred on June 
22, 1981 and of the figures used to calculate the withdrawal 
liability.  Kahle enclosed a first installment payment of $9,467 
with the letter.  App. at 26-27. 
 On August 2, 1984, the Fund's counsel advised Kahle by 
letter that he would raise the request for review of the 
withdrawal liability determination at the next meeting of the 
Fund Trustees and would speak to the union about Kahle's claims 
of continued negotiation and representation.  Counsel also posed 
questions to Kahle about its claim of continuing negotiation with 
the union.  App. at 59-60. 
 Kahle's response dated September 13, 1984 made clear 
there were no negotiations to end the strike and that picketing 
continued until April 1982, but that "[b]oth parties remained at 
the call of the Federal Mediator."  In the last sentence of that 
letter, Kahle stated that "pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2644.2(c) the 
  
Company will discontinue quarterly payments."4  App. at 28-29. In 
fact, the referenced PBGC regulation did not authorize Kahle to 
withhold the scheduled payments but merely prohibited the Fund 
from declaring default during the pendency of arbitration.  See 
29 C.F.R. § 2644.2.       
 Kahle sent the Fund's counsel a letter on December 20, 
1984, demanding arbitration.5  Before the Fund's counsel had 
received the December 20, 1984, letter, he wrote to Kahle's 
counsel on December 21, 1984, stating that the Trustees saw no 
reason to change their determination that Kahle had withdrawn 
from the Plan.  App. at 30.  The December 21 letter also stated, 
"Please be . . . advised that your client is now in default in 
its payments.  Unless it cures this default by the 1st of January 
1985, our client will have no alternative but to declare your 
client 'in default' and seek all remedies available to it . . . 
under appropriate federal legislation."  App. at 30.  
                     
4
.  The September 13 letter was never received by Fund counsel 
although the Fund does not contest its contents, and there are 
later letters that referred to it. The Fund appears to have 
suggested in the district court that the September 13 letter 
constituted a demand for arbitration that tolled the accrual of 
its cause of action and the consequent statute of limitations, 
but the district court gave that argument short shrift because it 
is undisputed that neither party took any steps to invoke the 
arbitration procedure.  In the view we take of the statute of 
limitations issue, we need not decide whether the allusion to 
arbitration by the employer would have stopped the accrual of the 
cause of action for any length of time.  
5
.  The contents of this letter, and particularly the demand for 
arbitration, are referred to in the Fund counsel's subsequent 
letter of December 28, 1984.  App. at 61-62. 
  
 On December 28, 1984, the Fund noted receipt of Kahle's 
letter of December 20, 1984, enclosed another copy of the Fund's 
actuarial calculations, and stated again that the Fund saw no 
reason to alter its determination of the fact of or date of 
withdrawal, but indicated a willingness to review its 
calculations if Kahle provided more specifics.  The Fund 
acknowledged Kahle's demand for arbitration and suggested that 
the parties "proceed in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association for all purposes," reserving any 
objections including timeliness for the arbitrators.  The Fund 
also offered to discuss "these matters on a less formal basis."  
App. at 61-62.   
 There is no evidence of further communications, 
negotiations, or arbitration proceedings after December 1984. 
Kahle did not make any further payments.  Almost four years 
later, on August 9, 1988, the Fund notified Kahle "that the 
company is in default in its withdrawal liability payments," 
demanded all past due payments plus interest, and stated that if 
Kahle did not make such payments within sixty days the Fund would 
require "immediate payment of the total withdrawal liability, 
plus interest accruing from the date the first payment was due."  
The Fund also demanded that Kahle post a bond for $271,746, the 
full amount of withdrawal liability.  App. at 63-64.  The record 
contains no evidence of further communications until the filing 
of this suit. 
 The Pension Fund filed the complaint in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey on September 
  
28, 1993.  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  
Following a hearing on February 28, 1994, the district court 
granted Kahle's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the 
case as time-barred under the MPPAA's six-year statute of 
limitations.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f)(1). 
 The district court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1132(e)(1) and 1451(c) and we have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  A district court's grant of 
summary judgment is subject to our plenary review.  Mitchell v. 
Commission on Adult Entertainment Est., 10 F.3d 123, 129 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Our review of the statute of limitations under the MPPAA 
is similarly plenary.  Doherty v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 
16 F.3d 1386, 1389 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 III. 
 Discussion 
 On the date this lawsuit was filed, September 28, l993, 
Kahle was still within the payout period established by the 
Pension Fund pursuant to the MPPAA for Kahle to complete payment 
of its withdrawal liability.  That period was not scheduled to 
expire until January 1994.  Although the six-year statute of 
limitations precludes the Fund's recovery of any payments due 
more than six years before the filing of its complaint, and the 
Pension Fund apparently so concedes, we fail to see any 
persuasive reason why the Fund should not be entitled to recover 
the payments due during the six years preceding the filing of its 
lawsuit. 
  
 The district court reasoned that the Fund's cause of 
action arose when Kahle missed its first payment in October 1984 
and, at the latest, December 21, 1984.6  Under the district 
court's theory, and that accepted by the dissent in this case, 
the failure of the Fund to file its suit within six years from 
that date meant that the Fund's action was untimely, even though 
it was filed while there were still payments to be made. 
 We believe that the district court erred when it failed 
to recognize that the employer's obligation to make the scheduled 
payments is akin to the obligation to make installment payments.  
In an installment contract, a new cause of action arises from the 
date each payment is missed.  See 4 A. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts § 951 (1951).   
 The principles applying the statute of limitations to 
installment payments are well established: 
 In the case of an obligation payable by instalments, 
the statute of limitations runs against each instalment 
from the time it becomes due, that is, from the time 
when an action might be brought to recover it. 
 
 ....  
 
  The rule that the statute of limitations begins to 
run against each instalment of an obligation payable by 
instalments only from the time the instalment becomes 
due applies although the debtor has the option to pay 
the entire indebtedness at any time.  On the other 
hand, where there is an acceleration clause giving the 
creditor the right upon certain contingencies to 
declare the whole sum due, the statute begins to run, 
only with respect to each instalment, at the time the 
instalment becomes due, unless the creditor exercises 
                     
6
.  It is not clear from the record on what basis the district 
court concluded that the latest date for accrual of the cause of 
action was December 21, 1984. 
  
his option to declare the whole indebtedness due, in 
which case the statute begins to run from the date of 
the exercise of his option.  
 
51 Am. Jur. 2d: Limitation of Actions § 133. 
 As Corbin explains, unless there is a repudiation 
(analogous to a default and acceleration under the MPPAA), the 
plaintiff may only sue for each breach as it occurs, and the 
statute of limitations begins to run from that time.  See Corbin 
supra, § 989; see also United States v. La France, 728 F. Supp. 
1116, 1119-20 (D. Del. 1990) (holding that the cause of action 
for collection of installment payments under a Small Business 
Administration loan accrues on each installment from the date it 
falls due in the absence of acceleration). 
 The analogy of scheduled payments under the MPPAA to 
installment payments was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit when it 
held that interest accrues on overdue withdrawal liability from 
the due date of each missed payment rather than from the due date 
of the first installment.  See Carriers Container Council v. 
Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 948 F.2d 1219, 1222-24 (11th Cir. 1991).  The 
court reasoned that accruing interest from the date of the first 
installment would amount to an improper retroactive acceleration 
of interest.  Id. at 1223.  But cf. New York Teamsters Conference 
Pension & Retirement Fund v. McNicholas Transp. Co., 658 F. Supp. 
1469, 1476 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (ordering interest from first date of 
missed payment under schedule), aff'd, 848 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 
1988).  Although the context of Carriers Container was different 
than the case before us, that court's treatment of each 
  
installment as a separate amount due is in line with the theory 
proffered by the Pension Fund. 
       The Fund also refers us to Ludington News Co. and 
Michigan UFCW/Drug Employers Pension Fund Workers Union and Drug 
and Mercantile Employers Joint Pension Fund, 9 Employee Benefits 
Cas. (BNA) 1913 (1988), an arbitrator's decision viewing the 
withdrawal liability as an installment contract obligation under 
which "the statute does not begin to run with respect to a 
particular installment until that installment falls due."  Id. at 
1916.  Although we recognize that Ludington is without 
precedential effect, it was cited as relevant by another circuit.  
See Joyce v. Clyde Sandoz Masonry, 871 F.2d 1119, 1124 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 918 (1989).  We also note that 
Ludington relied on Jackson v. American Can Co., 485 F. Supp. 370 
(W.D. Mich. 1980), a case that does provide a meaningful analogy.  
In Jackson, the court declined to apply the statute of 
limitations as a basis to summarily dismiss an action by a 
retiree who had been told in l963 of the decision to give him 
reduced pension benefits when they became due in l973.  Id. at 
374-75.  The court noted that the pension plan may qualify as an 
installment contract, under which claims do not accrue until each 
payment comes due.  Id. at 374.  
   The strongest authority in support of the holding of 
the district court and the arguments of Kahle is the decision of 
the Seventh Circuit in Central States, Southeast and Southwest 
Areas Pension Fund v. Navco, 3 F.3d 167 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1062 (1994), which, although it arose in 
  
another context, rejected the position of the pension funds in 
that case that a new cause of action arose when the employer 
failed to make each scheduled payment when due. 
  In Navco, the pension funds sought to recover the 
unpaid withdrawal liability from Navco, a partnership which was 
part of a corporate group with two firms which withdrew from a 
pension plan.  The pension funds relied on the MPPAA provision 
that all members of a group under "common control" are liable for 
each other's withdrawal liability.  Id. at 169 (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(b)(1)).  Suit against Navco was filed more than six years 
after the first payment by its affiliated corporations was due.  
Id. at 170.  The district court dismissed the suit as untimely, 
rejecting the claim of the pension funds that they had six years 
from their discovery of the existence of Navco to file suit.  The 
court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that the statute of 
limitations ran from the accrual of the cause of action rather 
than from the discovery of the identity of additional responsible 
persons, id. at 172, an issue not before us.   
 Because suit was filed more than six years after the 
first scheduled payment was due (but within six years of the last 
scheduled payment), the court also had to consider when the cause 
of action accrued.  It agreed with the district court that the 
whole claim comes due when the first payment is missed, phrasing 
its analysis as follows:  
 The pension fund has only one claim against the 
employer (and, derivatively, against the controlling 
persons): the amount of withdrawal liability.  Although 
a fund may permit an employer to amortize this sum over 
20 years, 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1)(B), the whole amount 
  
is presumptively due at the outset. Section 1391 calls 
on the pension plan to determine an amount that is 
owed; the financing options under § 1399(c) do not 
break this single debt into little pieces with their 
own statutes of limitations.  
 
 
Id. at 172.  
 Even before turning to the policy behind the MPPAA, we 
find the Navco decision unpersuasive.  Consider, for example, a 
mortgage with a twenty-year payout in a jurisdiction with a six-
year statute of limitations.  If, for some reason, the mortgage 
company fails to sue the mortgagor for more than six years after 
the mortgagor fails to pay the first and succeeding payments, 
would it be seriously argued that the mortgage company is 
precluded thereafter from suing for those payments due within the 
six years preceding the lawsuit or from exercising the 
acceleration clause as to the remaining fourteen years?  
 Moreover, we believe that the reasoning of the Seventh 
Circuit is not supported by the statutory language nor the 
purposes behind the statutory scheme of the MPPAA.  The position 
of Kahle and Navco that the whole sum becomes due and the whole 
claim accrues when the first payment is missed in effect imposes 
a compulsory acceleration clause.  This reads out of the statute 
the relevant statutory provision with respect to acceleration 
codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5), which makes acceleration 
discretionary.  That provision states: 
  (5) In the event of a default, a plan sponsormay 
require immediate payment of the outstanding amount of an 
employer's withdrawal liability, plus accrued interest on the 
total outstanding liability from the due date of the first 
payment which was not timely made.  
  
29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5) (emphasis added). 
 One must assume that when Congress provided that in the 
event of a default "a plan sponsor may require immediate payment 
of the outstanding amount of an employer's withdrawal liability," 
Congress also intended that the plan sponsor could decide not to 
accelerate the outstanding balance.  That option is nugatory if 
Kahle is correct, because the claim would accrue automatically 
upon default.   
 We cannot overlook that the statute endorses setting a 
schedule of periodic payments lasting up to twenty years.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1)(B).  If, after making timely payments for the 
first year, the employer ran into financial difficulty and missed 
two quarterly payments, under the literal language of the Navco 
opinion the claim for the remainder of the unpaid liability would 
have accrued at that time.  Suppose, however, that the employer 
regains some financial stability, pays the past due claims, and 
resumes making timely payments for six years.  Thereafter, it 
ceases all payments.  Is the pension fund's claim for the 
remaining thirteen years of payments now barred because it failed 
to file suit within six years of the first missed payment?  We 
see nothing in the statutory language that requires the patently 
inequitable result of permitting an employer to escape much of 
the twenty years of scheduled withdrawal payments because an 
action to collect the entire balance is not brought within six 
years after any one missed payment.  
 Indeed, such a result would, if accepted, set up 
perverse incentives.  Automatic default on the entire balance 
  
from the date of the first missed payment discourages amicable 
resolution of disputes and discourages reentry into the fund as a 
contributing employer.  If an employer is late on one payment or 
misses a payment, must the plan sponsor refuse to accept a late 
payment and press for the entire balance, even if this pushes the 
company into insolvency?  Forcing the plan sponsor into a 
position where it must pursue zealous collection efforts at the 
expense of facilitating negotiations over reentry or waiting for 
a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the 
union undercuts the need for flexibility to ensure solvency.7  
 Although there is no evidence in the record as to 
industry practice in these circumstances, there appears to be 
some merit to the argument made in the brief of the Amicus Curiae 
National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans in 
support of the Pension Fund that presumptive default, as adopted 
by the Seventh Circuit in Navco, will force trustees to 
accelerate and sue, even though this action may not be in the 
                     
7
.  There is support in the legislative history that Congress 
intended to grant some discretion to plan sponsors.  
Specifically, the House Education and Labor Report notes that the 
MPPAA purposefully gave plan fiduciaries "a great deal of 
flexibility to strike a balance among the competing 
considerations of encouraging new entrants, discouraging 
withdrawals, easing administrative burdens, and protecting the 
financial soundness of a fund."  H.R. Rep. No. 96-869, 96th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 67 reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918, 2935.  
Furthermore, even if the plan sponsor chooses rules that "would 
eliminate or reduce liability, the choice of such a rule is not 
per se a violation of a fiduciary standards [sic]; the 
determination must be made as to whether the fiduciary has acted 
reasonably . . . and in accordance with the fiduciary standards."  
Id. 
  
best interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.  See 
Amicus NCCMP Brief at 6. 
 The Pension Fund's position receives support from the 
decision of the D.C. Circuit in Clyde Sandoz.  871 F.2d at 1120.  
The court reversed the dismissal of an action brought by the 
pension fund to recover the assessed withdrawal liability from 
the employer because the district court had erroneously measured 
the six-year period from the employer's withdrawal from the fund.  
In its opinion, the D.C. Circuit held that the cause of action 
arose from the date upon which the employer failed to make a 
payment on its withdrawal liability demanded by the plan sponsor.  
The court reasoned that the action that "adversely affected" the 
plan was the failure to make the scheduled payment, and that 
therefore the cause of action accrued at that time.  The court's 
discussion of the effect of an employer's failure to make a 
payment that is "due and owing," 29 U.S.C § 1401(b)(1), according 
to an amortized schedule lends some support to the Pension Fund's 
argument that the cause of action for individual payments does 
not accrue until the payment date has passed, because only then 
is the payment "due and owing" within the statute.  Id. at 1123-
24. 
 The Clyde Sandoz court also referred to the purpose of 
the MPPAA in its interpretation of the statute, noting that that 
purpose was to ensure fund solvency by continuing payments under 
an amortized withdrawal liability schedule of payments.  The 
court observed that Congress's overriding purpose of ensuring 
plan solvency was followed by a more general goal of facilitating 
  
collection and a narrower goal of ensuring prompt collection.  
Id. at 1126.   
    We are not unaware of the argument that Congress 
signalled its interest in prompt resolution of withdrawal 
liability by requiring the plan sponsor to send the withdrawing 
employer a notice and demand for payment "as soon as practicable" 
after the withdrawal, see 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1), and that 
spreading the time to file a complaint for missed payments under 
the "installment contract" theory of liability would run counter 
to this intent.  But as the Clyde Sandoz court noted and the 
Congressional history demonstrates, Congress was interested in 
establishing a balance between different goals.  When Congress 
deems time of the essence, it establishes a statute of 
limitations considerably shorter than the six-year statute in the 
MPPAA, see 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f)(1), among the longest in federal 
statutes.  Congress's express authorization to the plan sponsor 
to establish a lengthy twenty-year period for the schedule of 
payments, see 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1)(B), provides strong evidence 
that Congress wanted to give the employer an extended period of 
time to be able to accrue the funds to pay the withdrawal 
liability.  It is unlikely Congress would have done so had it 
believed that the beneficiaries of multi-employer funds would 
suffer drastically if the plan sponsors select payout periods 
that give the employer up to a twenty-year period to pay out the   
entire amount due.   
  
 We find apt the language used in Clyde Sandoz in 
rejecting a similar argument that focused on the need for prompt 
collection of withdrawal liability.  The court stated: 
  Sandoz's reading of the purposes and 
policies animating the MPPAA is curiously 
one-dimensional.  To be sure, Congress has 
indicated that promptly collecting 
outstanding sums is desirable. . . .  The 
employer's reading of the statute would 
elevate one narrow statutory policy (favoring 
prompt collection) over the more general goal 
(collection) and overriding purpose 
(solvency) which animate and generate that 
narrow preference.  There is no indication 
that the Act requires, as Sandoz would have 
it, either prompt collection or no collection 
at all. 
 
871 F.2d at 1126. 
 Kahle overstates its case when it argues that the 
installment analysis would give the Fund "limitless time to file 
a complaint,"  Appellee's Brief at 15, an argument echoed by the 
dissent.  The Fund is still subject to the six-year statute of 
limitations.  Thus, a plan sponsor which had established a twenty 
year payout and chose to wait twenty years to pursue its cause of 
action would only be able to collect the last six years of 
installments and would necessarily forego the remainder, a result 
which should provide adequate disincentive to unnecessary delay.  
The plan sponsor remains subject to the fiduciary duties placed 
on it by ERISA and the MPPAA, and it is therefore unlikely that 
the running of the statute of limitations will be at the plan 
sponsor's "whim," as the dissent suggests.8  
                     
8
.  We find curious the dissent's concern that under this opinion 
Kahle will escape payment of over $150,000 (presumably the amount 
  
 In light of the statutory language, we reject the 
district court's holding that the cause of action for all of the 
unpaid withdrawal liability accrues when the first installment 





the dissent calculates was due under the twelve payments from 
October 1984 through July 1987), dissent typescript op. at 18, 
when under the dissent's view Kahle would escape payment for the 
remaining 26 payments, which a rough calculation shows would be 
more than $250,000, assuming interest as computed by the Fund. 
9
.  The dissent appears to suggest that the notice of default 
sent by the Pension Fund to Kahle on April 23, l984 could be 
viewed as the acceleration notice authorized under 29 U.S.C. § 
1399(c)(5).  Kahle has not so argued nor did the district court 
so view it.  Nothing in the language of the April 23, l984 letter 
suggested acceleration.  The Pension Fund argues that there is a 
distinction between the mandatory notice that sets the amount of 
withdrawal liability and the schedule for repayments, required 
under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1382, 1399(b)(1), and the discretionary notice 
of acceleration authorized under 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5), which it 
contends it sent on August 9, l988.  There is some statutory 
support for the distinction, as the two notices are in separate 
provisions, and the acceleration provision would have no 
significance if the mandatory notice of the amount of withdrawal 
liability were also to be viewed as a notice of acceleration.   
 
 In this case, we need not decide whether the plan 
sponsor would retain the right to accelerate and sue for the 
total amount due had it previously brought an action to recover a 
delinquent payment, because that is not what happened here.  The 
Fund did not bring any earlier suit.  Furthermore, because all of 
the payments accelerated as of the August 9, l988 notice (from 
August 9, l988 to the final payment due January, l994) are 
covered by the six-year period before the filing of the complaint 
(which would sweep back to September 28, l987), we need not 
consider the effect of the August 9, l988 notice.  Presumably, 
the one or two quarterly payments due after the filing of the 
complaint will be covered by supplement or amendment to the 
complaint.  
  
 We conclude that under the statutory scheme established 
by the MPPAA, a plan sponsor has six years from the date a 
payment is due to sue for its recovery.  Absent a decision by the 
Fund to accelerate, the cause of action for payments not yet due 
does not begin to run when the first such payment is missed.  In 
this case, it is undisputed that the great bulk of the unpaid 
installments were due by Kahle within six years of the filing of 
the complaint by the Pension Fund.  It follows that the Fund was 
not time-barred from bringing suit for the total of the quarterly 
payments which fell due within the six years prior to the filing 
of this suit.10    
 For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
grant of summary judgment dismissing the complaint and remand for 
further proceedings. 
 
                     
10
.  Because of the view we take of the dispositive facts, any 
disputes between the parties as to the effect of the letters sent 
in l984 are irrelevant to our disposition.  For the same reason, 
we need not consider equitable arguments raised by the Pension 
Fund. 
  
Board of Trustees of the District No. 15 Machinists' Pension Fund 
v. Kahle Engineering Corporation, No. 94-5160 
 
 
ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
 
 In this matter, we must decide when a cause of action arises 
under the MPPAA for the unpaid balance of an employer's liability 
after the employer has withdrawn from a pension fund.  The 
district court concluded that the clock begins to run from the 
date an employer first fails to make a scheduled payment.  
Because the current action for the unpaid balance was filed nine 
years after the first missed payment, the district court 
dismissed this matter as barred by the six-year statute of 
limitations. 
 The Board of Trustees of District No. 15 Machinists Pension 
Fund ("Fund") contends that its time for filing an action for the 
unpaid balance runs six years from the date of the last scheduled 
payment set forth in the Fund's formal demand letter.  
Unfortunately, the majority has been persuaded by this argument.  
The majority holds today that a cause of action for the unpaid 
balance of an employer's liability to a pension fund is not 
barred by the statute of limitations if it is filed within six 
years of the last scheduled payment even if the employer failed 
to make any quarterly payments for twenty years.  Majority 
opinion at 22.  Because it is my view that the majority's 
decision finds no support in the text of the MPPAA, and is 
contrary to the law of the Third Circuit regarding the 
  
application of statutes of limitations, I must respectfully 
dissent. 
 In the MPPAA, Congress provided two straightforward options 
to a pension fund when an employer fails to make a scheduled 
payment on the liability flowing from a withdrawal.  The pension 
fund may bring an action for the missed payment within six years.  
The pension fund may choose, instead, to bring an action for the 
entire unpaid balance within six years of the first missed 
payment. 
 The majority has created a third option for the pension 
fund.  Under this option, the Fund may elect not to bring an 
action either for the first missed payment, or for the unpaid 
balance, within six years of the default.  Instead, the pension 
fund may "cho[o]se to wait twenty years to pursue its cause of 
action" for the unpaid balance, and would be able "to collect the 
last six years of installments."  Majority opinion at 22. 
 Contrary to the majority's view, the MPPAA does not place 
the fixing of the date that the cause of action accrues for the 
unpaid balance in the exclusive and unreviewable control of the 
pension fund, regardless of the prejudice to the defendant caused 
by delay in prosecuting the claim.  The MPPAA provides that an 
action must be filed within six years after the employer 
defaults.  Because this action was filed more than six years 
after the employer missed its first scheduled payment, I would 
affirm the district court's order dismissing this action. 
  
 I. 
 Before explaining the rationale that motivates my dissent, I 
will set forth the facts pertinent to this appeal.  Kahle was a 
member of a multiemployer pension plan sponsored by the Fund.  In 
1981, Kahle was involved in a labor dispute with its employees.  
As a result, the company suspended its contributions to the Fund.  
On April 23, 1984, the Fund determined that the labor dispute had 
terminated Kahle's obligation to continue making payments.  The 
Fund concluded that Kahle had effected a complete withdrawal from 
the pension plan.  Accordingly, the Fund sent Kahle a notice of 
its assessment obligation of $271,746 along with a schedule of 
quarterly payments and a demand for payment of the initial 
quarterly obligation of $9,467.  The payment schedule required 
that Kahle make thirty-eight additional payments of $9,467, and a 
final payment of $6,459.  The Fund also notified Kahle that the 
failure to begin payment as required would entitle the Fund to 
seek immediate payment of the full amount of withdrawal 
liability.11  
                     
11
.    The relevant portion of the demand letter is as follows: 
 
     We have determined that your company has effected a 
     withdrawal from the Fund.  In accordance with the Multi- 
     Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (the Act), 
     we hereby make request for payment of withdrawal liability 
     in accordance with the schedule described below. 
 
     According to our records, complete withdrawal occurred 
     on June 22, 1981.  Based on the method chosen by the 
     Trustees in accordance with the Act, we have computed your 
     company's liability to the Fund to be $271,746. 
 
  
 Kahle made its initial quarterly payment on July 2, 1984.  
That same day, Kahle informed the Fund that it had not withdrawn.  
Kahle also requested a review of the Fund's determination that it 
had completely withdrawn. 
 On August 2, 1984, the Fund requested that Kahle provide 
additional information concerning the labor dispute in order that 
the Fund could investigate Kahle's claim that it did not 
withdraw.  On September 13, 1984, Kahle responded to the Fund's 
request for additional information and also informed the Fund 
that it would discontinue making quarterly payments.     
 On December 20, 1984, Kahle sent the Fund a letter which 
included a demand to arbitrate the pension dispute.  The next 
day, the Fund sent a letter to Kahle in which it explained that 
it had found no basis for altering its prior decision that Kahle 
had completely withdrawn.  The Fund also warned Kahle that it had 
defaulted on its payments and that, if not cured by January 1, 
(..continued) 
     You are required to pay this amount in quarterly payments, 
     each in the amount of $9,467 (except for the last payment 
     which will be in the amount of $6,459). 
 
     Payments must begin no later than 60 days after receipt 
     of this notice, notwithstanding any request for review 
     or appeal.  Accordingly, your company's first quarterly 
     installment is due on July 1, 1984. 
 
     Failure to begin payment of withdrawal liability as 
     required may constitute a default, which will entitle  
     the Fund to require immediate payment of the full  
     amount of the withdrawal liability owed.  
 
  
1985, the Fund would declare a default and "seek all remedies 
available to it" against Kahle.12     
 On December 28, 1984, the Fund's attorney notified Kahle 
that Kahle's "letter of December 20, 1984, . . . must have 
crossed in the mails with mine of December 21, 1984."  The Fund's 
December 28 letter reiterated its position that there was no 
basis for reversing its conclusion that Kahle had withdrawn from 
the plan.  The Fund again advised Kahle that it was in default in 
its payment and stated further that unless the missed payment was 
made, the Fund would "seek all remedies available to it." 
 Kahle did not make any further payments nor did it initiate 
arbitration proceedings.  As the Fund candidly admitted in 
                     
12
.    The Fund's letter dated December 21, 1984, states: 
 
     Since our . . . letter to you of August 2, 1984, the 
Trustees 
     of the District No. 15 Machinists' Pension Fund have met and 
     considered your letter of July 2, 1984. 
 
     Please be advised that at this time and in part as a result 
     of your failure to respond to our earlier letter, the 
     Trustees can see no reason for changing their determination 
     that your client has withdrawn from the Plan.  Thus, your 
     client continues to be obligated to pay its withdrawal 
     liability.   
 
     Please be further advised that your client is now in 
     default in its payments.  Unless it cures this default 
     by the 1st of January 1985, our client will have no 
     alternative but to declare your client "in default" 
     and seek all remedies available to it [sic] client under 
     appropriate federal legislation. 
  
argument before the district court, it took no further action 
against Kahle until 1988.13   
 On August 9, 1988, the Fund sent Kahle a letter which 
stated: 
This letter is to inform you that the company 
is in default in its withdrawal liability 
payments.  We hereby demand, on behalf of the 
Fund, that the company immediately make all 
the past due payments, plus interest.  The 
interest shall be equal to the current prime 
rate, accruing from the date each such 
payment was due.  If you do not make such 
payments, including interest, within sixty 
(60) days from the date you received this 
letter, the Fund will require, in accordance 
with the Multiemployer Pension Plan 
Amendments Act of 1980, immediate payment of 
the total withdrawal liability, plus interest 
accruing from the date the first payment was 
due.  If necessary, the Fund will file an 
action in the United States District Court to 
enforce the company's obligation to pay. 
 
Kahle did not make any payments in response to this second 
notification of its default.  Over five years later, and nearly 
                     
13
.    The following colloquy occurred between the district court 
and the Fund's counsel, Ms. Roberto: 
     THE COURT:     What happened in 1985, '86, '87?  Zero. 
     MS. ROBERTO:   Well, the Fund was waiting for--to see 
                    what was going to happen with the arbitration 
                    with the labor dispute. 
     THE COURT:     Waiting for what?  In '85, in '86, in '87? 
                    Have you got any papers you want to show 
                    me that arbitration was commencing, people 
                    were looking for arbitrators and reviewing? 
                    Nothing happened.  I think candor on the 
                    part of your client is, Nothing happened in 
                    '85, '86, '87, so we sent the default in '88. 
     MS. ROBERTO:   I don't dispute that.  I have nothing to 
                    show you otherwise. 
  
nine years after Kahle missed its first payment, on September 28, 
1993, the Fund filed this action seeking payment of the unpaid 
balance of Kahle's withdrawal liability.  The district court       
granted Kahle's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the 
Fund's action was barred by the six year statute of limitations 
period in 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f)(1).   
 II. 
 The Fund contends that this action is not barred by the 
six-year statute of limitations.  It argues that its claim for the 
unpaid balance did not accrue until it gave Kahle notice on August 
9, 1988 that if all past-due payments were not made within 60 
days, it would file an action for the total well-drained 
liability.  According to the Fund,  
there are two (2) types of accrual dates for 
collection of withdrawal liability 
assessment.  One occurs when an installment 
payment is omitted.  At that point the 
pension fund has the right to bring suit for 
that one (1) payment.  The second is when the 
pension fund exercises its option to 
accelerate the outstanding balance after the 
employers failure to cure a default.  If the 
employer does not meet the pension fund's 
demand for the entire outstanding balance, a 
cause of action accrues for the total amount. 
 
Appellant's Opening Br. at 21. 
 The Fund asserts that the district court erred by   
failing to distinguish between the accrual of 
a cause of action for one installment payment 
and for the total outstanding amount of the 
assessment.  Although the district court 
stated that it was following Sandoz when it 
held that the Pension Fund's cause of action 
triggering the commencement of the MPPAA's 
  
six-year statute of limitations accrued in 
October 1984 or December 1984, it actually 
followed the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit's decision in Central States Pension 
Fund v. Navco, 3 F.3d 167 (7th Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1062 (1994). 
 
Appellant's Opening Br. at 23-24.   
 The Fund's reliance on Joyce v. Clyde Sandoz Masonry, 871 
F.2d 1119 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 918 (1989), is 
misplaced.  There is no intercircuit conflict on the issue 
presented in this case.  A careful reading of the Navco and Sandoz 
decisions demonstrates that these cases do not support the Fund's 
and the majority's interpretation of the applicable statutes.   
 In Navco, two pension funds, the Central States, Southeast 
and Southwest Areas Pension Fund ("Teamsters Fund") and the 
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union Pension 
Fund ("Independent Fund"), filed actions against Navco for 
withdrawal liability payments.  Navco, 3 F.3d at 169.  The 
employers had completely withdrawn from their multiemployer 
pension funds in January 1984.  Id.   
 On April 6, 1984, the Teamsters Fund sent a formal notice of 
withdrawal liability and a demand for payment to the employers.  
Id. at 170.  The employers were given sixty days to make the 
demanded payment.  Id.  No payments were made in response to the 
demand.  Id.  More than seven years after its demand, on May 1, 
1991, the Teamsters Fund filed its cause of action.  Id.   
 The district court granted the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment.  Id.  The court held that the action was barred 
  
by the six-year statute of limitations, which began to accrue on 
June 5, 1984, when the demanded payment became delinquent.  Id.  
On appeal, the Teamsters Fund argued that the district court erred 
when it held that the claim began to accrue when the payment 
became overdue.  Id.    
 On June 19, 1984, the Independent Fund sent the employers a 
notice, payment schedule, and demand for payment as a result of 
their withdrawal from the pension fund.  Id.  Pursuant to the 
schedule, quarterly payments were to begin on July 1, 1984, and 
continue until July 1, 1986.  Id.  The employers never made any 
payments.  Id.  Nearly eight years after its demand, on March 13, 
1992, the Independent Fund filed its cause of action.  Id.  
 The district court granted the employers' motion for summary 
judgment.  Id.  The court held that the Independent Fund's action 
was barred by the statute of limitations because the claim began 
to accrue on July 1, 1984.  Id.  The district court rejected the 
Independent Fund's argument that a claim accrues for the unpaid 
balance each time the employer fails to make a scheduled quarterly 
payment.  Id.  On appeal, the Independent Fund asserted that the 
cause of action began to accrue when it learned the identity of 
persons within the control group who had the ability to pay the 
withdrawal liability, as opposed to when the payment became 
overdue.  Id.  The Independent Fund also reiterated its argument 
that a cause of action accrued each time the employer failed to 
make a required quarterly payment.  Id. at 172. 
  
 The Seventh Circuit in Navco consolidated the appeals of the 
Teamsters Fund and the Independent Fund.  Id. at 170.  The Navco 
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment by both of the 
district courts.  The Seventh Circuit held that "the claim [for an 
employer's withdrawal liability] accrues as soon as payment 
becomes overdue."  Id. at 172.  Because the funds filed their 
actions more than six years from the date when the employers 
failed to make their scheduled payments, the Seventh Circuit held 
that the actions were barred by the statute of limitations.  Id.  
Additionally, the Navco court rejected the Independent Fund's 
contention that a claim begins to accrue each time an employer 
fails to make a scheduled payment.  Id.  The court held that the 
"pension fund had only one claim against the employer . . . : the 
amount of withdrawal liability. . . .  [T]he whole amount [of 
withdrawal liability] is presumptively due at the outset."  Id.  
 In Sandoz, the trustee of the Bricklayers and Trowel Trades 
International Pension Fund filed an action to collect the 
accelerated balance of the employer's pension withdrawal 
liability.  Sandoz, 871 F.2d at 1121.  Between 1977 and June 30, 
1981, Sandoz made payments to the pension fund.  Id.  On July 16, 
1981, a new collective bargaining agreement was reached between 
Sandoz and its employees.  Id.  The agreement did not include an 
obligation by Sandoz to continue making payments to the pension 
fund.  Id.  Sandoz made a pension fund payment for work performed 
  
by its employees from July 1 until July 15, 1981.  Id.  Sandoz 
made no further payments.  Id.   
 On July 13, 1987, the fund sent Sandoz a notice of 
withdrawal liability along with a payment schedule.  Id.  On the 
same day, the fund filed its action.  Id.  On October 8, 1987, the 
fund notified Sandoz that it failed to make its scheduled payment 
and would be in default unless it paid within sixty days.  Id.  
Sandoz did not make any payments in response to the fund's letter.  
Id.  
 The district court dismissed the fund's action because it 
was not filed within the six year statute of limitations period.  
Id. The district court ruled that the cause of action began to 
accrue when the employer completely withdrew from the plan on June 
30, 1981.  Id.  On appeal, the fund asserted that the cause of 
action began to accrue when the employer failed to make a 
scheduled payment after receiving a demand.  Id. at 1122. 
 The D.C. Circuit in Sandoz vacated the judgment of the 
district court.  Id. at 1127.  The court held that  
the [pension] plan is "adversely affected" 
(and thus that a "cause of action" arises) 
when the plan has not received payments which 
are due and owing.  The language of the 
statute points firmly in the direction of the 
conclusion that Sandoz's uncured failure to 
pay the sum demanded adversely affected the 
plan giving rise to a cause of action. 
 
Id. at 1122.  The D.C. Circuit rejected the district court's 
determination that the cause of action begins to accrue on the 
  
day the employer completely withdraws from the fund.  Id. at 
1123. 
 Thus, both the Seventh Circuit in Navco and the D.C. Circuit 
in Sandoz each concluded that a cause of action for withdrawal 
liability payments under the MPPAA begins to accrue when an 
employer fails to make a scheduled payment.  Contrary to the 
Fund's position in this matter, there is no conflict between the 
Seventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit regarding the determination 
as to when a cause of action begins to accrue.  The difference 
between Navco and Sandoz is that the Navco court expressly 
rejected an argument which is also raised by the Fund in this 
case, namely, that a cause of action accrues each time an 
employer fails to make a scheduled payment after receiving a 
demand.  Navco, 3 F.3d at 172.  This issue was not presented to 
the D.C. Circuit in Sandoz.  Neither Navco nor Sandoz support the 
Fund's argument in this matter that the statute of limitations 
does not begin to run until six years after the last scheduled 
payment is due.     
 Under the MPPAA, after an employer withdraws from a fund, 
"(1) [a]s soon as practicable after an employer's complete or 
partial withdrawal, the plan sponsor shall--(A) notify the 
employer of--(i) the amount of the liability, and (ii) the 
schedule for liability payments, and (B) demand payment in 
accordance with the schedule."  29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1).  The 
statute further provides: 
  
In the event of a default [of a scheduled 
payment], a plan sponsor may require 
immediate payment of the outstanding amount 
of an employer's withdrawal liability, plus 
accrued interest on the total outstanding 
liability from the due date of the first 
payment which was not timely made.  For 
 
purposes of this section, the term "default" 
means-- 
 (A) the failure of an employer to make, 
when due, any payment under this section, if 
the failure is not cured within 60 days after 
the employer receives written notification 
from the plan sponsor of such failure, and  
 (B) any other event defined in rules 
adopted by the plan which indicates a 
substantial likelihood that an employer will 
be unable to pay its withdrawal liability. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(5).   
 An action under the MPPAA may not be brought more than "6 
years after the date on which the cause of action arose."  29 
U.S.C. § 1451(f)(1).  Pursuant to section 1399(c)(5), the cause of 
action for the outstanding amount of an employer's liability 
arises upon the employer's failure to make a scheduled payment.  
See Navco, 3 F.3d at 172 (claim begins to accrue when a scheduled 
payment is overdue); Sandoz, 871 F.2d at 1122 (same).  However, a 
pension fund is not permitted to file its action for withdrawal 
liability payment(s) until it has sent an employer the notice 
described in section 1399(c)(5).  The notice represents a 
condition precedent which must be satisfied by a fund before it 
may file its cause of action. 
 The MPPAA makes clear that a multiemployer pension fund has 
the option after notifying an employer of a default of (1) filing 
  
an action for a missed payment in accordance with the schedule 
prepared by the fund after an employer has withdrawn, or (2) 
filing an action for the total amount that is owing in accordance 
with the schedule.  A fund has only one claim against an employer.  
It must decide whether to file an action for the missed payment or 
the total withdrawal liability.  Navco, 3 F.3d at 172.  The fund 
is required to file its action for payment of an employer's 
withdrawal liability within six years of the date when the cause 
of action arose, i.e., the date of the first missed payment.  Id.  
This statutory requirement avoids the problem of "improperly 
plac[ing] the running of the limitations period in the control of 
the plaintiff."  Board of Trustees of the Constr. Laborers Pension 
Trust v. Thibodo, 34 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 In Thibodo, the defendant, a construction company, made 
payments to a pension fund until June 15, 1983.  Id. at 916.  In 
early 1984, the pension fund determined that the company had 
withdrawn from the fund.  Id.  The fund sent the company an 
assessment along with a payment schedule.  Id.  However, the 
company believed that the fund had erroneously determined that it 
had withdrawn, and the fund ultimately agreed.  Id.  
 By the spring of 1985, the company had rehired numerous 
construction workers.  The pension fund subsequently reinstated 
the company's withdrawal liability assessment.  Id.  The company 
did not make any pension fund payments.  Id.  In April 1986, the 
fund sent the company a written notification indicating that the 
  
company had sixty days to begin making payments.  Id.  The company 
never made any payments in response to the fund's notification.  
Id.  On June 20, 1989, the fund filed an action for withdrawal 
liability payments.  Id.  
 The district court stayed the proceedings while the parties 
submitted the matter to an arbitrator.  Id.  The arbitrator 
determined that the company had withdrawn from the pension plan on 
June 15, 1983 and that Thibodo, the company's sole shareholder, 
was personally liable for the company's withdrawal liability.  Id.  
Thibodo argued before the district court that the fund had filed 
its action more than six years after the cause of action accrued 
and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations.  Id.  The 
district court agreed with Thibodo and dismissed the fund's 
action.  Id.  
 The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district 
court.  Id. at 918.  The court held that the statute of 
limitations under section 1451(f)(1) begins to accrue "from the 
date on which the conditions for complete withdrawal specified in  
§ 1383(b)(2) have been met."  Id. at 917.  The Ninth Circuit 
recognized that its holding differed from that of the D.C. Circuit 
in Sandoz, which held that the statute of limitations begins to 
accrue when the employer fails to make a scheduled payment after 
receiving a demand from the fund.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit's 
decision in Thibodo, however, was concerned with discrete 
statutory language used by Congress with reference to withdrawals 
  
involving the construction industry.  Id.  Its conclusion that a 
pension fund cannot manipulate the date when a claim begins to 
accrue under the MPPAA, however, is consistent with the holding in 
Navco on this issue. 
 III. 
 In this matter, the Fund's cause of action for the balance 
of the withdrawal liability arose on October 1, 1984, when Kahle 
missed a payment after receiving a payment schedule and a 
corresponding demand.  See Navco, 3 F.3d at 172 (cause of action 
begins to accrue when a scheduled payment is missed); Sandoz, 871 
F.2d at 1123 ("[T]he failure to pay gives rise to a cause of 
action.").  The Fund had six years from October 1, 1984 to 
exercise its option to file an action for the missed payment or 
the total unpaid balance of the employer's withdrawal liability.  
29 U.S.C. § 1451(f)(1). 
 At oral argument, the Fund argued that it was authorized 
under section 1451(f)(1) to file its action six years after the 
employer had failed to make the penultimate payment due on October 
1, 1993.  The final payment in this matter was due on January 1, 
1994.  The Fund's interpretation of section 1451(f)(1) would 
permit it to wait until the year 2000, approximately sixteen years 
after the first payment was missed, to file its action for the 
unpaid balance.  This result would award a pension fund additional 
time to file its action merely because it was dilatory in pursuing 
its claim.  See Navco, 3 F.3d at 172 (extending a six year statute 
  
of limitations under Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 
1980 to twenty-six years "is a job best left to magicians").   
 Such a result is clearly inconsistent with the public policy 
served by statutes of limitations.  These statutes are designed 
"to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the 
citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, 
witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost," 
to put potential defendants "on notice of adverse claims," and "to 
prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights."  Sperling v. 
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 24 F.3d 463, 471-72 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(internal quotation omitted); see also Navco, 3 F.3d at 172 
("Statutes of limitations serve vital social interests--the usual 
ones of preventing stale claims that may be hard to prove, and 
protecting the interest of potential defendants in knowing their 
liabilities, and in the MPPAA the unusual one of protecting the 
beneficiaries of the fund.").  Additionally, permitting a fund to 
choose the triggering date which begins the running of the statute 
of limitations essentially makes the fund's dilatory decision 
unreviewable by a court.   
 The majority has failed to point to any language in the 
MPPAA that supports its conclusion that Congress intended to place 
the running of the statute of limitations in the hands of the 
pension fund.  I agree with the majority that the MPPAA gives a 
pension fund the option to file an action for a missed payment or 
an action for the unpaid balance of the employer's liability after 
  
a default.  The fact that Congress gave the pension fund a choice 
as to the remedy it may follow if a payment is missed, however, 
does not affect the six-year statute of limitations.   
 The harm that can flow from delay in filing an action is 
illustrated by the record in this case.  The majority states that 
"[t]here is no evidence of further communications, negotiations, 
or arbitration proceedings after December 1984."  Majority opinion 
at 11.  The explanation for the absence of a record of the actions 
taken by the parties following the Fund's December 21, 1984 notice 
of default is found in the Appellant's Opening Brief.  Counsel 
explains throughout his brief that correspondence between the 
parties concerning the employer's withdrawal liability was "not 
available from the Pension Fund's or Fund counsel's files," 
Appellant's Opening Br. at 6 n.2, that "[t]here is no information 
in the Pension Fund's files to indicate course of events before 
default notice," id. at 10 n.3, and further the "Fund's counsel 
did not receive the September 13, 1984 letter."  Id. at 5. 
 The Fund's dilatory tactics in this matter have affected its 
own ability to prepare for trial.  Moreover, Kahle will now be 
forced to trial more than ten years after the facts that the Fund 
alleges make it liable.  Kahle's corporate records, counsel's 
files, and witnesses' memories are subject to the same loss 
already experienced by the Fund. 
 IV. 
  
 This court has explained that the goals of the MPPAA are "to 
protect the interests of participants and beneficiaries in 
financially distressed multiemployer plans and . . . to ensure 
benefit security to plan participants."  IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund 
v. Barker & Williamson, 788 F.2d 118, 127 (3rd Cir. 1986) 
(internal quotation omitted).  The majority's interpretation of 
section 1399(c)(5) seriously frustrates Congressional intent.   
 Congress' concern that a pension fund act promptly in 
protecting the integrity of the pension plan is reflected in the 
requirement that the demand for payment of the employer's 
liability after a withdrawal be made "as soon as practicable."  29 
U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1).  The majority's conclusion that a fund may 
delay filing an action for the total amount of the outstanding 
liability for up to twenty years is contrary to the expressed 
concern of Congress that a pension fund take timely action to 
resolve a dispute concerning an employer's liability. 
 In construing section 1399(c)(5) to place the running of the 
statute of limitations in the hands of the pension plan, the 
majority would apparently approve of the loss of fourteen years of 
payments owed by the employee to the Fund.  The majority's 
construction of the MPPAA is clearly inconsistent with the 
congressional goal of safeguarding the financial integrity of the 
multiemployer plan.  The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of 
section 1399(c)(5) in Navco ensures that an employer who misses a 
payment must make up that payment within sixty days of the 
  
scheduled date, or be subject to an action for the total unpaid 
balance of its withdrawal liability.  Had the Fund filed its 
action within six years of the first missed payment in this 
matter, Kahle would have been liable to pay over $270,000.  Under 
the majority's view, Kahle will escape payment of over $150,000.  
This will unfairly force the other participants to increase their 
contribution to protect the beneficiaries of the Fund.  
Traditional canons of construction require us to construe a 
statute to avoid a result that defeats congressional intent.  
Adoption of the reasoning in Navco would fully protect the 
interests of the beneficiaries of a pension plan. 
 V. 
 The notice requirement in section 1399(c)(5) is solely 
applicable to a cause of action for the total unpaid balance of an 
employer's withdrawal liability.  Thus, the Fund's December 21, 
1984 threat to "seek all remedies available to it" could only 
refer to an action for the total unpaid balance.  As conceded by 
the Fund, the MPPAA does not require service of a notice of 
default where the pension plan elects to bring an action for a 
misconduct.  Appellants Opening Br. at 21. 
 The Fund attempts to escape the consequences of its failure 
to file this action within the six-year limitation period by 
arguing that the notice of default it sent to Kahle dated December 
21, 1984 was "defective," and therefore did not trigger the 
running of the statute of limitations.  Appellant's Opening Br. at 
  
29.  This argument is frivolous.  To accelerate payment of the 
outstanding withdrawal liability pursuant to section 1399(c)(5), 
the plan sponsor must give the employer written notification of 
its failure to make any payment when due.  The Fund's December 21, 
1984 letter informed Kahle's counsel "that your client is now in 
default in its payments."  The letter further advised Kahle that 
unless the default was cured, the Fund would "seek all remedies 
available to it."  The December 21, 1984 letter substantially 
complied with the notice of default requirements of section 
1399(c)(5).  The running of the statute of limitations for the 
total unpaid balance was therefore triggered by the December 21, 
1984 notice of default. 
 VI. 
 The majority finds support for its conclusion that the 
statute of limitations for the total unpaid balance begins to run 
anew from the date of each scheduled payment in the common law of 
contracts.  The Seventh Circuit rejected a similar argument in 
Navco: 
The schedule under § 1399(c) . . . is not 
contractual; the employer did not assent to a 
longer period for payment and suit.  We have 
not seen any case extending the contractual 
approach to the MPPAA, and like the district 
court we believe it would be imprudent to 
adopt a rule that relieves pressure on 
trustees of pension funds to act with 
dispatch.  Six years is quite sufficient; the 
trustees may not award themselves more. 
 
Navco, 3 F.3d 167-68.  
  
 I would not borrow from the law of contracts to negate the 
intent of Congress that pension funds must act promptly to avoid 
compromising the financial integrity of the pension fund and 
requiring other participants to shoulder the responsibility of 
employers who withdraw.  The majority's reliance on the 
arbitrator's decision in Ludington News Co. and Michigan UFCW/Drug 
Employers Pension Fund Workers Union and Drug and Mercantile 
Employee Joint Pension Fund, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1913 
(1988), to support its contractual theory is questionable.  The 
majority states "[a]lthough we recognize that Ludington is without 
precedential effect, it was cited as relevant by another circuit.  
See Joyce v. Clyde Sandoz Masonry, 871 F.2d 1119, 1124 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 918 (1989)."  Majority opinion at 
14-15.  A careful reading of Sandoz, however, reveals that 
Ludington was not "cited as relevant" for the proposition that a 
new cause of action for the unpaid balance accrues when each 
scheduled payment is due.  That issue was not discussed by the 
court in Sandoz.  Instead, Ludington was cited because it, too, 
concluded that no cause of action arises until the employer 
refuses to meet the demand of the fund.  Sandoz, 871 F.2d at 1124.  
As noted above, the analogy to the law of contracts adopted by the 
majority in this matter was expressly rejected by the Seventh 
Circuit.  Navco, 3 F.3d at 172-73. 
 CONCLUSION 
  
 Contrary to the majority's resolution of the issue before 
this court, the MPPAA does not permit a pension fund to file a 
cause of action for the unpaid balance of an employer's withdrawal 
liability six years after the last payment is due, even if no 
payments have been made for up to twenty years.  Regrettably, the 
majority has subjected the running of the statute of limitations 
to the whim of the Fund.  I find nothing in the law of the Third 
Circuit or any other jurisdiction that supports this extraordinary 
result.  Accordingly, I cannot join in the majority's opinion.  I 
would affirm the well reasoned judgment of the district court. 
 
